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Abstract
Bruno Latour’s seminal work We Have Never Been 
Modern urges us to consider what he calls “a 
parliament of things.” This notion of a “parliament of 
things” offers a new opportunity for the study of 
philosophy and anarchism. It is a start, but lacks a 
certain bravery and sense of adventure. In never 
being modern, we don’t find ourselves in the midst 
of a parliament of things, but an anarchy of things: a 
radical flatness of objects in which we must rethink 
property, politics and ecology. Additionally, Graham 
Harman’ s “Objec t Oriented Phi losophy” 
demonstrates and cultivates Latour’s work into a new 
type of ontological anarchism, not of humans, but of 
things. This project seeks to connect up the 
metaphysics of Latour and Harman with anarchism.
“Many have written their justification of God, their 
theodicy, but the time has come to write a 
justification of man, an anthropodicy.” 
--Nicholas Berdyaev1
Nicholas Berdyaev, the rarely read 19th century Russian 
philosopher, proposes a novel ontological project in his book The 
Meaning of the Creative Act.2 Berdyaev’s task was to defend the 
ontology of humanity through a methodology he, borrowing from 
theologians, called anthropodicy. Berdyaev’s project, while thought 
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provoking, falls short in a number of ways. Berdyaev inspires us to 
ask the right question, that of the centrality of humans, but he lacks 
a philosophy capable of answering the question of anthropocentrism 
in a helpful way. The project of this essay is to rehabilitate 
Berdyaev’s question toward a more interesting and adventurous 
plateau: an anarchist politics backed by a philosophy of objects. 
Berdyaev’s question nags at an impulse within anarchism, namely 
the rejection and negation of all authority. Contemporary ecological 
events and catastrophes demonstrate the exasperated relationship 
humanity shares with the rest of the world and our anthropocentric 
metaphysics and politics need to be rethought. We need an 
anarchist politics that imagines that another world is possible, but 
more than just a human world: we need an anarchism of things.
Speculative Anthropodicy
As theodicy is a justification of God to humans, it follows that 
anthropodicy is a justification of humanity to humans. While 
theodicy is concerned with the existence of evil in a world created by 
a God that is omnibenevolent, an anthropodicy is less concerned 
with the evil of humans, but rather their metaphysics. The 
introduction of metaphysics into discussions of anarchism will 
invariably leave a bad taste in the mouths of some – and rightfully 
so. The anthropodicy Berdyaev performs gives rise to the 
metaphysical problems that have always been a plague to anarchists, 
namely the rise of metaphysical hierarchy. 
Metaphysical hierarchy is always problematic for anarchists because 
it facilitates oppression and the centrality of power in the really 
existing material conditions of the world. Largely, the jettisoning of 
metaphysics for materialism is a good move, but as I will argue later, 
any materialism needs clarification and amendment. Unfortunately, 
Berdyaev, the thinker from whom I am pilfering the notion of 
anthropodicy, stands complacent and even reinforces metaphysical 
hierarchy of the human entity. The human has an “exceptional 
consciousness” and that the “way of anthropology is the only way of 
knowing the universe.”3 Because the parameters of Berdyaev’s 
project seek to question the ontology of humans it is an 
overwhelming disappointment that he immediately assumes the 
central privilege of the human and in the first few pages nonetheless. 
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Berdyaev immediately abandons all philosophical realism with little 
to no questioning or argumentation. The whole of the universe is 
surrendered to the supremacy of humanity. Berdyaev goes on to 
say, “[A] philosophy which exerts itself to deny the exceptional 
significance of man in the world and refuses to recognize man as the 
exclusive source of knowing the secret and meaning of the 
world...destroys that philosophy itself.”4 Frustratingly, Berdyaev 
immediately privileges human techniques of knowledge. Berdyaev’s 
anthropodicy is done in bad faith because he sets out from the 
beginning of the meditation with an answer already in hand: human 
privilege is justified ontologically above other entities. In some ways, 
Berdyaev’s anthropodicy, made in bad faith, makes some sense – 
the centrality of the human is existentially gratifying, but reinforcing 
this assumption does not get us anywhere. 
However, we need something more adventurous, risky and less safe 
– anthropodicy cannot simply reassure the human’s ability to know 
secret knowledge or ontological supremacy, but it has to at least 
attempt the speculative project of a world in which humans are not 
at the center. This is an attempt towards a speculative anthropodicy. 
The speculative anthropodicy is a negative project that attempts to 
subtract the centrality of humanity. It begins with an ontology that 
does not assume the hierarchy of humanity over nature, but assumes 
the flatness of being – an ontology fitting for anarchism. In other 
words, through a flat ontology there is no hierarchy to be enforced – 
everything is equally an object.
A flat ontology takes up the univocality of being or as Deleuze puts 
it, “a single voice raises the clamor of being.”5 Though, this ought 
not to be interpreted so haphazardly to justify the equal reality of 
things, but simply as Graham Harman clarifies, it is an equality of 
objects.6 In other words, objects all have an autonomous reality 
apart from human relations and human access. It is not that a 
werewolf and the White House are both just as real, but that they 
are both equally objects – the werewolf has an autonomous reality 
just as the White House does. Both of these objects, the werewolf 
and the White House act or have a presence regardless of their 
existence. In Harman’s most recent book on Latour’s politics, he 
succinctly states that the efficacy of the equality of objects is what is 
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important. All things may have an equal presence, but the 
magnitude of their efficacy, or the object’s strength, is what counts.7 
The importance of this claim on objects will be made clear in the 
coming sections. 
A speculative anthropodicy tries to consider the things in the world 
as they are apart from human perception and access. This is the 
philosophical speculation of realism – the notion that things do not 
exist for us, but that they have an autonomous reality from us. This 
is in stark contrast to idealist or materialist metaphysics of 
transcendent nature and a secondary culture. As we will see, idealist 
and metaphysical metaphysics, which prop up anthropocentrism, 
are largely a product of the techniques of modernism. 
So much of the contemporary philosophy at the end of the 20th and 
the whole of the 21st have been devoted to parsing out the idea of 
modernism and various reactions to it. Philosophers have theorized 
the pre-, post-, post-post, alter- and meta- modernisms, but all of 
these movements and reactions assume something fundamental 
about modernism: that it has actually happened or that it continues 
to happen. For example, consider Lyotard’s work The Postmodern 
Condition: “What, then, is the postmodern? […] it is undoubtedly a 
part of the modern.”8 Postmodernism, according to Lytoard, is a 
nascent modernism. I would suggest that many postmodern insights 
and trajectories have a lot to offer us politically and aesthetically. In 
no way should we erase or discard any of these reactions to 
modernism, but let’s bracket them for now. 
Alternatively, Bruno Latour provides a theoretical framework that 
deals with modernism in a particularly unique and helpful way. In 
his book, We Have Never Been Modern, Latour describes the 
performance of the actually existing pseudo-modernity in terms of 
productive ontological mechanisms and scientific apparatuses.9 
Latour talks about modernism in two ways. First, and rather briefly 
stated, modernism is a discursive regime: “The adjective ‘modern’ 
designates a new regime, an acceleration, a rupture, a revolution in 
time.”10 Second, modernism is a set of techniques that translate and 
purify things ontologically. The former, more or less, is the way 
we’ve thought of modernism since the postmodern reaction and I 
think it is overall agreeable. Though, the latter is much more 
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interesting. 
Latour suggests that “[…] the word ‘modern’ designates two sets of 
entirely different practices which must remain distinct if they are to 
remain effective, but have recently begun to be confused.”11 These 
practices are translation, which “[…] creates mixtures between 
entirely new type of beings,” and purification, which reinforces 
ontological envelopes of nature and culture.12
Translation is an undertaking that makes connections between 
things. It is the translation of one thing into another. For example, in 
translation we find the novel and new existences of things that are 
both nature and culture. Monsanto’s genetically modified soybeans 
are a hybrid of nature and culture. Soybeans, which are usually 
sorted into the natural category and the act of genetic modification, 
which is a human science, are merged into one thing: a hybrid 
object, or ‘actor,’ appears. Additionally, it is through the work of 
translation in which we can make connections between greenhouse 
gasses, carbon emissions and capitalism. Hybridization is the 
technique by which we undo the bifurcation of nature and culture. 
Hybrids, however, do not sit well within the modern schema. 
Purification is the technique that undoes the hybridity or translation 
in modernity. Purification is the default metaphysical assumption 
that sorts out what is human and what is nonhuman ontologically. 
The mechanism of purification is an archetypal machine that 
functions by securing things into their proper ontological envelope. 
Purification is the means by which the bifurcation of nature and 
culture is maintained and within this move is a latent idealist 
metaphysics.
While both translation and purification occur separately and 
discretely, we are modern. However, these two processes are not so 
tidy: they occur simultaneously, they are confused, breakdowns in 
the sorting process occur, the Gordian knot has become tangled 
again. When we think of this so-called modernity in the 
retrospective light of these modern processes, we realize many 
confused hybrid objects present throughout modern technology and 
science. These things that we demarcate as either human or 
nonhuman have an autonomous reality apart from our sorting 
machines and are social constructions. At once, this sounds a bit 
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anti-science, or at worst a descent into relativistic thinking, though 
this is not the case.
Isabelle Stengers demonstrates one such confusion in the history 
and sociology of science. Stengers notes that the discovery, for lack 
of a better word, of the neutrino is one of these complications of 
modernity. 
In short, the neutrino exists simultaneously and 
inseparably ‘in itself’ and ‘for us,’ becoming even 
more ‘in itself,’ a participant in countless events in 
which we seek the principles of matter, as it comes 
into existence ‘for us.’13
The neutrino exists autonomously from human actors regardless of 
claims of discovery or scientific import. The scientist captures, 
purifies and translates the neutrino through the mechanisms of 
modernity. We bring the neutrino into our perception, and the 
neutrino “brings us into existence.”14 The neutrino gains strength as 
an actor for us, yet it always existed in itself.
Modernity is the production of the world for us as human actors. 
Human actors are only a small portion of things in the world, yet we 
assume the contrary, we assume dominance, centrality and so on all 
to the detriment of ourselves and other actors. We have never truly 
been modern, things have never been so simple as being either 
human or nonhuman, nothing can ever really be purified or 
disentangled. Because we have never been modern, we need to 
remove the existential and philosophical urge to purify the world 
around us.
In Latour’s work, the way forward is in what he calls a “parliament 
of things,” here, I think Latour is onto something of political interest 
to anarchists, though I suggest an important amendment, not a 
parliament of things, but an anarchy of things. This is not just a 
clever turn of phrase, but the desire for an egalitarianism, ecology 
and democracy that excludes the notion of human exceptionalism 
and includes a direct democracy of nonhuman objects. In the 
anarchism of things, there are collectives, confederacies, communes 
and individual actors. Only an anarchy of things has room for the 
multifarious ways objects couple and part. 
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This more radical tendency may put us at odds with Latour himself. 
It is unclear exactly what a Latourian political philosophy looks like 
in practice, but it seems as though it ought to include something 
more radical than just a representative democracy or parliament. To 
graft in nonhuman actors requires an increase in mediation, as 
Harman states in his work on Latour’s politics, “[…] stronger and 
better connections need to be built between actors.”15 To make 
these stronger connections, as Latour states, we need a more radical 
politics to go along with these metaphysics.
Ecology & Politics
Environmentalism at this time is less concerned about the 
environment, which is the wide and rich ecology of nonhuman 
actors we find ourselves in the midst of, and more about securing 
the future of the anthropocene. There’s a misplaced focus only on 
the environment as it relates to human actors, and even more liberal 
environmental politics offer up solutions that are magnitudes below 
impending catastrophe. Liberal ecologists suggest that using different 
light bulbs, driving a Prius, only eating free range beef, and other 
minor lifestyle politics, are the answer to the heavy ecological 
burden of human actors. An ecological crisis can no longer be kept 
at bay and we ought to start thinking about the apocalyptic plans for 
all actors, not just humans. 
Even increasing the magnitude of these lifestyle politics aren’t going 
to do us much good, asceticism for the masses isn’t possible in our 
late capitalist political economy, human desire is driven by 
capitalism and just consumes too much. The very structure of 
capitalism thrives on the processes of modernization as well as the 
production and consumption that subsequently occur. Ditching 
capitalism is the first step to be taken on the same level of 
magnitude as ecological crisis, and the second is to ditch nature. 
Capitalism is an economic assemblage that hinges on growth carried 
out by networks of actors. In capitalism, things are sorted 
ontologically, purified and reified as commodities that are strictly 
‘for-us.’ This whole set of operations is incredibly taxing on the 
network of human and non-human actors. Laborers are, of course, 
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exploited, but so are all varieties of objects that get caught up in the 
capitalist network. For example, we could cite the animal 
populations displaced in the harvest of resources.Or, the upper 
atmosphere that is constantly under siege from anthropogenic CO2. 
Neither the forests, nor its inhabitants, are considered. It is also the 
case that our diminishing layer of ozone is not adequately 
represented in political undertakings. 
Nature, thinking back to my summary of Latour above, is a default 
ontological category developed in modernism. Another way we can 
talk about nature, according to Latour, is in terms of as the material 
world or matter–nature is the sum total of all material things.16 This 
could devolve into materialism quickly, but as Latour points out, 
materialism is difficult to maintain in the face autonomous and real 
objects. We can’t simply equate what is observable and knowable by 
human actors as materialism, because it confuses human access with 
reality.
Here, I’ll quote Latour at length because the importance of this 
insight is crucial for the anarchism of things both metaphysically 
and, as we will see, politically:
This is why it is always so difficult to be a real 
materialist: matter, mistaken for the transportation of 
indisputable necessities through chains of cause and 
effect, is not the obvious, given background of the 
world but instead a highly elaborated, historically 
dated, and anthropologically situated hybrid which 
combines the reference chains necessary to access 
the far away with the surprising inventions entities 
themselves have to go through in order to subsist.17 
Materialism confuses the human access to objects with the thing-in-
itself or roughly speaking reality. The problem is that scientific 
discovery is an anthropological event. Instead of materialism, this 
has a strong affinity with speculative realism and the work of 
Graham Harman, as I have already noted.
Following this trajectory, we can ditch nature as an obscure idea for 
a critical and speculative realism of objects. Nature as simply the 
beautiful backdrop of human actors is no longer maintainable in the 
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face of a speculative realism. When we stop thinking of nature as 
simply that which is not human, we can begin to contemplate other 
plateaus of political and ecological arrangement that consider non-
human actors in light of ecological disaster. 
Property
The modern technique of purification is the way we make objects 
into things for us. We can see purification at work anywhere, the 
grocery store, the real estate office, a national park, agriculture and 
so on. In economics, we see purification in the production of goods, 
namely the reification of a commodity. However, reification does 
not do purification justice, we need more than Marx’s theory of 
labor and alienation, though we ought not exclude it entirely. 
Purification is an ontological move that shapes the way we think 
about things. Like Stenger’s neutrino, we bring it to light in the 
scientific and productive apparatuses and it plays a part in our own 
existence and creation. Purification, rather than reification, is the 
way of claiming something as it is in relationship to human life. 
Through purification we make the world for us, in these mechanics 
we find the modern desire for property. 
Property, economically thinking, is the result of purification and it is 
how we come to own an object with an autonomous existence. We 
can own a neutrino, a star or a can of beans. In the acquisition of 
property, we can observe the hierarchical metaphysics of capitalism 
in which human actors, through the transference of metaphysical 
properties, can arbitrarily own things. This is not to say that capital 
or labor are only metaphysical, though they are more or less 
aleatory at this point in finance capitalism, but the right or potential 
of ownership as a human activity is metaphysical and relies on the 
transcendence of human actors. 
Owning property in capitalism has very real and material effects, but 
that status of ownership is a metaphysical category just as much as it  
is a political one. Ownership assumes that the human actor has the 
metaphysical superiority to dominate and master an object. The 
human actor, in the metaphysics of capitalism, is like a Russian doll 
that can stack and take things into itself. Owning land, another 
autonomous entity, requires the technique of purification, because 
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only through purification can we know whether a thing can or 
cannot be owned. Land is able to be determined as not human and 
it can easily be parceled off and transferred to another actor. 
Though, thinking in the mode of a flat ontology, the land, regardless 
of exchange of deed and capital, belongs to the human just as much 
as it belongs to the sky, an elephant or the stream that cuts across 
the land. Certainly, objects can touch, affect one another and change 
utterly, but ownership of one actor by another actor requires the 
metaphysical superiority of one over another. 
Property rests on the metaphysical assumptions of Humean 
empiricism that assumes an object is simply a bundle of qualities 
that are accessible to us in a relational way, however this 
relationalism does not do objects justice as a metaphysical  
explanation–objects are more than their relationships with other 
objects. A flatness or equality of objects means that there is a 
withdrawn and internally inaccessible real object to every object that 
we can observe empirically.18 In other words, objects are more than 
they are for us, objects exists beyond an empirical metaphysics and 
beyond use or exchange values. Obviously, this sort of metaphysics 
makes the economic analysis of capitalism or any political economy 
rather difficult or weird. Metaphysically speaking, human ownership 
is impossible; objects withdraw from us as well from one another 
ownership can only ever be for us and capitalism cannot function 
with such a weak metaphysics. 
The loss and gain described in accounts of classical economics 
hardly makes sense thinking in the mode of anthropodicy and 
Latour’s “amodernism.” The decentering of the human subject 
demonstrates the illusory nature of property. Moving forward, an 
anarchism of things, rather than a parliament of things, is the 
opening of relations and communication between things through the 
increased mediation between actors. This sort of metaphysics 
necessitates a universal anarchism where things cannot be entirely 
grasped by human actors, or any actors for that matter. A new 
adventure is forged in the opening of this anarchism. Nothing can be 
left the same: all belonging, and the ‘for-us’ of things, has to be 
rethought, held weakly or clarified on the impossibility of access to 
the thing-in-itself.
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The Anarchism of Things
The anarchism of things, then, is both a metaphysical proposition as 
well as the ground for a political project. Our new metaphysics lead 
us to the exit of our pseudo-modernity: this is not post-modern 
anarchism, but ‘amodern’ anarchism. The minimization of human 
primacy through anthropodicy gives human actors the insight to 
think more inclusively about non-human actors in terms of property 
and ecology. An anarchism of things already exists, yet is constantly 
converted into hierarchy through human actors. Therefore, the 
anarchism of things is waiting on the anarchism of humans.
Echoing Bakunin, “Who is right, the idealists or the materialists?”19 
Materialism is a modernist idea and, as Latour says, we have never 
been modern. Materialism is the grand gesture by which Marx and, 
in turn, Bakunin patch together a theory of human history and of 
class struggle. We, as amoderns – those who have realized 
modernity has never quite occurred – cannot so easily pronounce 
materialism over idealism. In the face of ecological crisis, to reduce 
everything to the economic paradigm and material conditions is to 
neglect the autonomous reality of things. The future of anarchism is 
not in idealism or materialism, but is in realism.
Materialism is a statist metaphysics: it is a totalizing worldview that 
gives humans a particular privilege over other actors in that humans 
‘discover’ and demarcate things as if they already did not exist and 
did not have an autonomous reality apart from our own observation. 
For materialists, objects are inlayed with boundaries and boarders; 
the state takes shape through the material analysis of space. 
Surveyors, GPS satellites and cartographers are implicit in the 
metaphysical defaults materialism brings to techno-science. The 
reduction of all to their economic and scientific realities does not rid 
the world of property; it simply explains it in terms of an alternate 
metaphysics and gives alternative schemes of distribution or 
ownership. After all, socialism is just a schema where the ownership 
of the means of production changes hands. While even anarchism is 
often derived from materialist analysis, it is only ever an anarchism 
of human actors. This, perhaps, is a good start as long as we hold 
the place of humans in materialist discourse weakly. However, we 
need to go beyond materialist analyses of history and economics.
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Fusing together or creating an alloy of materialist economic analysis 
and the speculative realism of objects is a step in the right direction 
for a new plateau of anarchism. Human analysis of economics can 
hold onto materialism weakly as long as human actors try to 
recognize the importance of things as actors. The idea is to maintain 
the real existence of objects, alongside the material economic 
analysis important for anti-capitalist struggle. Capitalism needs to 
feel the full democratic push of exploited alienated workers, 
oppressed peoples and the groans of ecology. Individual human 
actors can vote, demonstrate and so on, but direct democratic input 
from non-human actors can be counted as well through technical 
mediation.
The measurement of glacial melt, anthropogenic carbon dioxide 
and chlorofluorocarbons in the air and the population of animal 
species are democratic pushes in one direction or another. 
Privileging only the human voice has always been the basis of 
modern politics and economics, but allying our future political 
endeavors with nonhuman actors incorporates another vector into 
an anarchist and democratic politics. Future political projects rely on 
establishing better and more vocal connections between actors, not a 
representative democratic institution, but a direct democracy 
through technical means. 
The anarchism of things fulfills the rejection of hierarchy essential to 
anarchist politics and on this new plateau of anarchism the 
hierarchical status of the human actor can be overturned or 
decentered. A world that is only for us is no longer a viable political 
starting point–to continue this line of thinking is to neglect the reality 
of a vibrant world of objects, or what we call mistakenly call nature. 
Both modern and post-modern movements in anarchism 
remain important, but the fact that we have never been modern 
provokes us to move toward another direction. No longer stuck 
between poles of modern and post-modern we forge a new path 
away from the centrality of the human entity. On this side of 
anthropodicy, we begin to see that there is really another world 
possible, not just for us, but also for all things. The anarchism of 
things is a direct democracy that moves beyond the good 
intentions of the human actor. From here, we join the affinity 
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groups of glaciers, organize with air molecules and protest those 
digital apparatuses that keep us in debt.
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